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The Psychic Structure of the Couple in 
Waiting for Godot 
Mary F. Catanzaro* 
With Waiting for Godot, Beckett expands the concept of the * 'pseudocou-
ple' ' that he had begun in Mercier and Gamier. He returns also to the problem of 
the self as a succession of always subverted beings, ever subject to the process 
of a continually decanting time—the same problem he had probed in his very 
early Proust (1931). The playing at master and servant, the switching of roles, 
and the manipulation of props in order to achieve mastery (which make up the 
bulk of Mercier and Gamier) do not concern him here as much as the sense of 
failure and incompleteness that these activities, so feverishly engaged in, seem 
to evoke. 
While Mercier and Camier relate to each other through their objects, 
Vladimir and Estragon interact through their language. Aside from the tree, 
their language behaves as the major dramatic prop, and it creates a blurring in 
their characters because language is (im)material to begin with and works 
through time, habit, and memory. What permits their language to become an 
object is the presence of the absent third party, Godot, who affects an 
unresolved duality in the structure of the pseudocouple's consciousness. Their 
existence is an example of the Berkeleian dictum, esse est percipi, in that their 
conception of To Be is to belong to and be seen by someone else. But their 
state of waiting elicits an absence within them because Godot is not there. In 
this way Beckett comes closer to the center of being, which Sartre tells us, in 
now classical existentialism, is haunted with nothingness, although we are in 
these post-Heideggerian times jaundiced about the existence of being and 
more inclined, as in Lacanian thought, to approach whatever it is that is not 
there as a lack, which produces never-ceasing desire. 
Yet Waiting for Godot nevertheless posits a slender hope, despite over-
whelming evidence to the contrary, that communication will be possible, and 
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with communication a chance that the real self, the Essence, will at last 
appear. This play depends upon the tension stemming from the sense that 
non-communication may not always be the rule, but that something will be 
said or done that will release the subjects simultaneously bound to each other, 
yet perpetually alone. But Vladimir and Estragon are held in stasis. Because 
they are suspended in waiting, their every attempt to reach the "ideal core of 
the on ion" 1 is denied them. And even if all their frantic attempts to peel away 
its successive layers were within their grasp, they would discover that there is 
in fact nothing there. For the state of waiting produces a sensation of absence 
in the core of the self, and its paradoxical configuration endows the subject 
with free will and slave will at the same time. They wait for the Other; they 
indeed incorporate the Other into themselves. Vladimir and Estragon adopt 
slave will by constituting themselves and their language as an object which 
substitutes for the Other (who is absent). All the events and the levels of 
consciousness in Waiting for Godot may be contained within this context. But to 
understand these implications fully, we must now consider what lies beyond 
these existential/phenomenological concepts (with their Hegelian underpin-
ning), and move on in another way to describe the dematerialization of the 
pseudocouple. In this play, Beckett searches for the means of finding an image 
for inner states of breakdown, disintegration, and merging. 
The dissolution of the pseudocouple's seeming stability into a fluent 
continuity comes about through fear and laughter. The darkness of the night 
that causes Vladimir the greatest anxiety is emblematic of his fear of facing the 
other—Godot. Secondly, Vladimir 's laughter, or more correctly, his gaping 
grin and the burst of laughter that he always stifles, exposes the unreach-
ableness of the matrices through which both he and Estragon have become 
fossilized. Vladimir 's urgent need for Godot and for his companion, yet 
Godot 's absence and Estragon's uncooperativeness, seem to say: there are two 
hells on earth; one is called Together; the other is called Alone, and it is the 
worse of the two.2 
To avoid the latter horror, Vladimir collapses into comedy, in consequence 
of which he " l iberates" himself by "enslaving" himself. Vladimir, though 
very funny at times, is never far from tears because of his awareness of his 
essentially tragic situation, that of his own insufficiency. Because he realizes 
that nothing can be altered (or that Nothing can never be altered), his laughter 
bursts whenever he is most deeply troubled. For example, when he mentions 
that one of the thieves was saved, and ventures so far as to suggest they repent 
(but does not want to go " into the details" of what), Estragon boldly blurts it 
out: " O u r being bo rn?" (8). The stage directions and the dialogue which 
follows bear some examination. " Vladimir breaks into a hearty laugh which he 
immediately stifles, his hand pressed to his pubis, his face contorted. One daren't even 
laugh any more. . . . Merely smile. (He smiles suddenly from ear to ear, keeps 
smiling, ceases as suddenly)" (8). This burst of laughter, which occurs very early 
in the play, is the almost-nothing into which the entire meaning of the play 
sinks. And further, because the basic plot is so simple and sparse, the fact that 
we are given the play, in a sense, twice, from slightly different angles in each 
act, indicates that Beckett attaches importance to nothing happening. Where-
upon Vladimir, after his stifled laugh, echoes Estragon's opening line and 
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concludes likewise, "Nothing to be done . " He then proceeds to pick up the 
issue of the Bible and the Gospels once again, refusing to relinquish the 
question of the two thieves. Shortly thereafter, when Estragon asks if they've 
" n o rights anymore ," we hear once more the "Laugh of Vladimir, stifled as 
before, less the smile." He then says, "You 'd make me laugh if it wasn't 
prohibited" (13). Because he stops it in midflow, his burst of laughter never 
really takes place, but its substitutes do, and they are: waiting, "ki l l ing" time, 
and Godot. These three "devices" provide the sense of continuity of place, or 
space, in the play. At the same time they uncover the increasing impairment of 
the couple's bond. 
Over against this, however, we are given an image of survival, for 
Vladimir and Estragon continue to hope to be reunited through communica-
tion with a self they imagine exists somewhere outside time. And surely that is 
why it is so crucial for Vladimir to inform Pozzo that " T i m e has stopped" 
(24) when the latter consults his watch with monotonous regularity. In the 
meantime, however, they need a purpose in time to erect a structure for their 
actions, and especially for their habit, to which they have become addicted. 
This habit is Godot. And this habit moreover depends on time. They obey the 
calls of their habit to escape solitude, even when that habit produces no hope; 
for their habit itself is their pitiless master. 
Their waiting is like any waiting for an event to take place, an arrival or 
departure of someone or something, when the present moment assumes a kind 
of hallucinated reality. Michael Robinson tells us that " t ime is only sufferable 
when it is given the illusion of va lue ." 3 Vladimir and Estragon embark 
accordingly on their various repetition compulsions. Their activities are not 
the products of unhinged minds (and perhaps are not even absurd), for Freud 
has taught us that compulsive repetition is something that a subject is not 
conscious of. The compulsive element is not neurotic at all, and " i t is just as 
or no more compulsive than breathing or the changing of the seasons."4 
Hence, Vladimir "minces like a mannikin ," (46) and rummages through his 
pockets; they do their exercises; they play at Pozzo and Lucky; they permute 
their hats and examine their boots. 
But their most spectacular compulsion is their "artificial" struggle: 
"Tha t ' s the idea, let's contradict each other" (41); or later, " T h a t ' s the idea, 
let's abuse each other" (48). This fake struggle affords them two reliefs. In 
namingand being named—"Vermin!" "Sewer ra t !" "Abor t ion!" —and so 
on, they live in a state of reciprocity. Their pretend fight gives them an 
opportunity to "make it u p " afterwards and embrace. 
Secondly, this synthetic argument is also an entertaining way to fill in the 
deadly hours they put in when Godot is not there, to Vladimir's great relief. 
" H o w time flies when one has fun!" (49). Under these circumstances, their 
verbal struggle is a marvelous replication. of Freud's famous fort da. They 
resemble the child who compensates for the disappearance of his mother by 
staging himself the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach. 
By creating absence as a game in order to make up for the mother's actual ab-
sence, and by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, the child enabled him-
self to master what once overwhelmed him. Given this view, will it be possible 
for us to ask: does the word " G o d o t " represent the absent mother in the fabric 
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of Vladimir and Estragon's verbal fort da? Might it also be said that his maternal 
" G o d o t " (like the tree which brings forth leaves in the second act) thus 
assumes inverted phallologocentric attributes? The replication is also har-
bored in the two-act. structure in which "no th ing" happens twice, the fort da 
being a two-act drama. Their repetitions also prevent them from " th inking;" 
and their little activities kill time, according to Estragon, "so we won't hear 
. . . all the dead voices" (40). Without their repetitions, Vladimir and 
Estragon would otherwise feel overcome and disrupted by time. Their 
repetitions thus seem to indicate two identities sharing the same consciousness 
in one happening (of nothing) in time. 
For example, as in a train travelling from A to B and pausing unscheduled 
at C, the unexpected interruption in time suspends the traveller in the middle 
of nowhere acutely conscious of the minutes that are slipping away. Similarly, 
Vladimir and Estragon are uneasy with the diffuseness of a time which they 
cannot master, and so suffer an urgent need to preserve homeostasis. Thus 
when their little games fail them, they frantically begin others. "Tha t passed 
the t ime , " says Vladimir after Pozzo's first visit. " I t would have passed in any 
case ," Estragon counters. But Vladimir refuses to relinquish his sense of 
mastery over anxiety: "yes, but not so rapidly" (31). 
What enables Vladimir and Estragon's language to function in essence as 
an exercise in fort da?. Roland Barthes observes that absence is constituted in 
waiting. Waiting means that the other is not there; he is absent. 
Absence persists—I must endure it. Hence I will manipulate it: 
transform the distortion of time into oscillation, produce rhythm, 
make an entrance onto the stage of language (language is born of 
absence: the child has made himself a doll out of a spool, throws it away 
and picks it up again, miming the mother's departure and return [and] 
a paradigm is created). Absence becomes an active practice, a [stage] 
business (which keeps me from doing anything else); there is a creation 
of a fiction which has many roles (doubts, reproaches, desires, 
melancholies) . . . To manipulate absence is . . . to delay as long as 
possible the moment when the other might topple sharply from absence 
into death.5 
Absence here bespeaks the muted urgency of Vladimir and Estragon's 
efforts to endure not only each other through their doubts and reproaches, but 
it also yields a tiny hope that a larger Other might exist, and in existing, 
return to their world and help them tolerate the alternate "suffering of being" 
and the "boredom of living" (P. 8) in which they find themselves. But there is 
no Other beyond them, for the two will become, tormentingly, one through 
that third party. Godot. Hence the "Proustian equation" of subject and 
object is fused again in the binary system: the "p r imary" Godot, though 
absent, is the zero through which the " b a s e " two (Didi and Gogo) become yet 
another " p r i m a r y " : one. But this one is inadequate. For, though what 
happens is the coming in contact, touching and being touched, the cutting off 
of contact comes about through the subterfuge of memory and habit, which 
make up the " T i m e Cancer ." 
Their deceptive management of time, a ritual manipulation, is marked by 
stereotyped and compulsive features. These repetitions reveal that Vladimir 
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and Estragon are subordinated to habit to an even greater degree. They 
imagine they are free agents, but their habit of waiting forces them to forfeit 
their freedom. They are not entirely aware of their collusion with habit, and 
each says in effect, I have no hope, but all the same I continue. Of the two, 
Estragon is more disturbed by this habitual exercise. "We ' r e not tied? . . . . 
To your m a n " (14). But Vladimir is more comfortable with habit and 
responds, " I get used to the muck as I go along" (14). 
Like Robinson, Barthes discerns that delirium inhabits waiting. The being 
that Vladimir and Estragon are waiting for is not real; they therefore 
hallucinate him. Their waiting moreover requires that they do nothing. They 
behave as though they have received "orders not to move" (LD 38). With this 
punctilious reasoning they invest Godot with power, and thereby assume an 
aggressive link with him. I am speaking here of aggression in the sense that 
Freud uses it when he detected an element of revenge in an active manipula-
tion of absence. The child's game says in essence to the absent one, " G o away 
then! I 'm sending you away myself!" Thus Godot's nonpresence (which 
makes them wait) reveals their subjection, for they depend "on a presence 
which requires time to be bestowed . . . To make someone wait [is] the constant 
prerogative of all power" (LD 40). The phantom Godot does not make time 
for them at all, of course, and Vladimir is only kidding himself when he tells 
Estragon that they have waived their rights rather than lost them when the 
latter grows restless about his status of waiting and threatens to walk away. Yet 
even as they speak they are aware that they have forced language into an 
object to be manipulated. Within the context of the timelessness in which they 
find themselves (because Godot does not bestow any on them), they realize 
subconsciously at least that progress is impossible. "Nothing to be done" — 
the antiphonal response to their every litany—has the same unsettling effect as 
an unresolved plagal chord. 
At this point, it may be useful to ask: what enables Beckett to make a 
sanctuary of Nothing? A return to the end of Proust might provide a clue. In 
his reference to the da capo he says, "these considerations explain the beautiful 
convention of the cda capo' as a testimony to the intimate and ineffable nature 
of an art that is perfectly intelligible and perfectly inexplicable" (P. 71). Like 
the music that Beckett refers to, Godot is apprehended not in space but in time 
only. 
But in Waiting For Godot a. mutation of the da capo takes place. Beckett 
informs us that Proust 's Swann spatializes what is extraspatial in identifying 
the sonata of Vinteuil with Odette. But Vladimir and Estragon identify Godot 
and their dialogue about him (in other words, their language) with their 
repetition compulsions. The couple expect that the word Godot will unveil 
some invisible reality and give order to the objects and language they 
manipulate. "Le t ' s g o . " " W e can ' t . " " W h y no t?" "We ' r e waiting for 
Godot ," demonstrates that nothing changes. The word slides away, and the 
image remains dull and all too familiar. They listen to their voices; whereupon 
their relationship to language is inverted: the word ceases to be an indicator, it 
becomes a thing. Whenever the pseudocouple invoke the word Godot, they do 
not discover a new image of themselves (their "invisible reality"), for the 
word is just another object. Beckett conducts us to the inevitable conclusion 
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that although Proust recognized the ideal, "invisible reality" in music, it is 
this very inaccessible invisible reality itself " that damns the life of the body on 
earth as a pensum and reveals the meaning of the word: 'defunctus' " (P. 72). 
The word in Waiting for Godot relates, therefore, to the repetition compulsions 
that Vladimir and Estragon engage in. It also affects their location in space and 
any possible connection they might make with Godot. Since the word Godot 
originates from within them, their suffering and pain is the necessary 
complement of their pleasure. This pleasure is simultaneously their own, as 
well as the other's (Godot's), because he is incorporated. We are witnessing in 
their stichomythia, which is ultimately a questioning of the value of words, the 
very breakdown of the couple. 
Unity with Godot is complicated additionally by time. Beckett says in 
Proust that even if the "object of desire . . . is achieved by the subject, then the 
congruence is so perfect, the time-state of attainment eliminates so accurately 
the time-state of aspiration, that the actual seems the inevitable, and, all 
conscious effort to reconstitute the invisible and unthinkable as a reality being 
fruitless, we are incapable of appreciating our joy by comparing it with, our 
sorrow" (P. 4). And finally, because Vladimir and Estragon imagine that the 
object of their desire is a being that can be materialized in a body, they cannot 
possibly make contact with all the points of space and time that Godot 
occupies, even if he were real. 
We may approach the binary nature of the pseudocouple's consciousness 
from yet another perspective. Hegel long ago concluded that thought and the 
object of thought are identical and reached through an experience of 
difference: for the master does nothing; he is. And the slave is not; he does. 
Hegel places his concept of master and servant within the notion of subject 
and object, and expands it. In Hegel's dialectic of pure being we first come to 
face the idea of nothing. If we think of the notion of pure being, we find that it 
is emptiness, nothing. Yet nothing is in the following way: The notion of pure 
being and the notion of nothing are opposites; and yet each passes over into 
the other. But the way out of the contradiction is at once to reject both notions 
separately, and to affirm them both together; that is, to assert the notion of 
becoming, since what becomes both is and is not, at once. In this way, 
Estragon's " N o t h i n g , " and the couple's activities are yet a further example of 
the blurring of their characters. 
We are now in a position to inspect more closely the collapsing borders of 
the pseudocouple's selves. Vladimir appears to be the master because he 
attempts to think things through and reason them out. With Estragon's bald 
"Nothing to be d o n e " at the opening of the play, Vladimir concurs but 
elaborates. " I ' m beginning to come round to that opinion. All my life I've 
tried to put it from me, saying, Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven't yet tried 
everything. And I resumed the struggle" (7). What struggle? we might 
inquire. The stage directions are of no help: "(He broods, musing on the 
struggle. . . ) . " It would appear that Vladimir's reasoning puts him in charge 
in a situation where nothing can be done. His struggle would then consist in 
avoiding Nothing by doing it, in liquidating Nothing from the scene, for he 
cannot bear the torment of "pu re being' ' that Nothing brings on. His struggle 
for mastery perhaps lies here rather than in a effort to lord it over his partner. 
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Vladimir's preoccupation is therefore mental, and he suffers more deeply 
than Estragon from the habit of reason which will not let his mind find rest. 
Again, his tendency to think analytically gives him the appearance of an 
assumed leadership. When he implies that he once dealt with Godot, it is 
strength of character and assertiveness that he wants to convey. It is he who 
assures Estragon they are in the right place, and it is he who dispenses the 
food. He is the more cultured. He quotes Latin and racks his memory for the 
correct word in his phrasing—"He searches for the contrary of saved"—the stage 
directions tell us (9). It is also Vladimir who tries to converse politely with 
Pozzo. 
But unfortuantely his thinking is faulty. When they discuss hanging 
themselves, Estragon sees at once that the branch will not hold both of them, 
but Vladimir pays no attention to this basic principle of gravity. He looks 
beneath the surface of words in hope of finding the Absolute answer. For 
example, in trying to figure out the branch issue, he "uses his intelligence, " the 
stage directions note with irony, and then he concludes, " I remain in the 
dark" (12). His compassion likewise is as inconsistent as his thinking. He is 
outraged when he sees the sores on Lucky's neck and remonstrates with 
Pozzo: "and now you turn him away? Such an old and faithful servant?" But 
when Pozzo gives way to grief he turns on Lucky: "how dare you!" It 's 
abominable! Such a good master!" (22-3). Each time he needs to think he 
takes off his hat and peers into it as if looking for the incarnated idea itself to 
pop out. Whenever he does this, his hat is much more than the vaudevillian 
prop it later becomes when he engages in an Abbot-and-Costello gag with 
Estragon. Unlike his predecessor, Sterne's Trim, Vladimir uses his hat as a 
dramatic prop which invests him with an inverted, ironic, and ultimately, 
failed mastery. 
Estragon, however, often destroys Vladimir's painstakenly built intellec-
tual "certainties" and forces him to cry out angrily, "Nothing is certain when 
you're about" (10). When Lucky leaves his hat (without which he cannot 
think) Vladimir snatches it up and says he prefers it to his own, which " i rked" 
him. Wishing a simple compliment from his friend, he inquires how he looks 
in his new hat. Estragon meanly replies, " H i d e o u s " (46). Thus when their 
little games break down they invariably end in cruelty or rejection. 
• Estragon, by contrast, is the more easily satisfied in their diversions, or 
else he is desperately trying to believe in them. " W e always find something, eh, 
Didi, to give us the impression we exist?" (44). He is also the more physical of 
the two. He explains the difference between Vladimir and himself to Pozzo: 
" H e has stinking breath and I have stinking feet" (31). Here their physical 
differences invite us to see the two as one body. Estragon's stinking feet, 
planted firmly on the ground (and in pain if the boots pinch), will remind us of 
the body's occasional predominance over the mind. 
Estragon is also more interested in food and sleep and unashamedly 
grovels after discarded chicken bones. At other times he is egotistical, 
petulant, and childlike. He sulks inert on a mound while Vladimir paces 
nervously to and fro, scanning the horizon for yet another answer, {"looking 
wildly about him, as though the date was inscribed in the landscape" [11]). Estragon's 
imagination, by contrast, is spontaneous and his habit is to personalize the 
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universe. Thus he compares his sufferings to those of Christ, or, in looking at 
his tattered clothes, imagines himself to have once been a poet. Though 
neither reads Scripture for spiritual edification, Estragon prefers the colored 
maps of the Holy Land in the Bible to the text itself, which may suggest that 
language means less to him. Vladimir, on the other hand, reads the Bible for 
logical clarification, but receives none. What disturbs Vladimir about the two 
thieves is the fact that one was saved and the other was not. The arbitrary laws 
of the universe create a deep disturbance in his rationalist sense of justice. He 
does not concur with Kierkegaard who remarked that this world is in bondage 
to the laws of indifference, but also added that it was different in the world of 
spirit. But since Vladimir is not concerned with the world of spirit, he cannot 
understand the illogic in the question of the thieves. He is not seeking a 
Christian solution to this dilemma, but simply wants a way out of death rather 
than damnation. 
Estragon's sufferings are almost entirely physical. He is concerned with his 
own pain and does not worry about others. His feet hurt. He is often hungry 
and sleepy. He delights in the body and physical coarseness and will not- pass 
up a joke at Vladimir 's expense when he has to relieve himself. Vladimir's 
agonized agitations also provide an entertaining spectacle for him. When 
Lucky is to "pe r fo rm," Estragon prefers to see him dance, while Vladimir 
wants him to " t h i n k . " Because of his childlike ways, Estragon is unfortu-
nately more easily the victim. But he is as inconsistent as his mate, for he can 
just as easily turn tormentor. When Lucky kicks him, he is of course hurt, and 
he spits on him in Act One. In Act Two, he vents an unspeakable physical 
fury on Lucky, and hurts himself in the bargain. Vladimir, on the other hand, 
contains his cruelty coolly. When he strikes Pozzo, the blow is executed with 
studied method, which he attributes to a "simple question of will-power" 
But while Vladimir seems to be master and in charge of their appointment 
with Godot, it may in fact be Estragon who is closer to the Proustian ideal 
because of his bad memory. It is very tempting to accord authority to 
Estragon, even though he is the needy one, and prefers eating and sleeping to 
intellectual Scriptural exegesis. Estragon may be more the master if we 
remember what Beckett states in Proust regarding memory. Because his 
memory is defective it is therefore less a function of the "clothesline" of habit, 
and more a function of discovery. Estragon's forgetting is therefore his virtue. 
In this way he thinks less of Godot as a habit, for he cannot even remember 
why he is waiting there at all. 
But Vladimir is the more insightful about habit. He realizes that time 
swamps them, that " the hours are long, under these conditions, and constrain 
us to beguile them with proceedings which—how shall I say—which may at 
first sight seem reasonable, until they become a habi t" (51). He nevertheless 
grows more willing to trade in " reason" and its concomitant suffering in time 
for the boredom that Beckett speaks of in Proust. He is Beckett's embodiment 
of the person who sees that "habit is a great deadener" (58) of the pain 
endured by the successive adaptations of one's sensibility to the condition of 
the world. Vladimir also realizes that these transitions between habit's little 
" t rea t ies" are symbolized as birth and death. "Astride of a grave and a 
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difficult birth. Down in the hole, lingeringly, the grave-digger puts on the 
forceps. We have time to grow old" (58). 
Accordingly, it is important to remember that habit is intimately linked 
with survival in both Proust and Beckett. Though we are made dull by habit, 
its evil structure is necessary and constitutes the core "of our smug will to live, 
of our pernicious and incurable opt imism" (P. 5). Stated dialectically, the 
knowledge obtained by habit 's compromises is acquired through acts whereby 
one "suffers" the "endurance" of them. Here suffering implies sufferance, 
the power to survive one's sufferings. 
But we are also under pressure to realize that Estragon's preference for 
sleep over philosophical discussions or the need for "cer ta in ty" reminds us 
also of Beckett's observation in Proust that the subject who is able to "escape 
into the spacious annexe of mental alienation, in sleep or the rare dispensation 
of waking madness" (P. 19) is better off. Indeed he informs Vladimir at one 
point that "we are all born mad. Some remain so" (51). Is Estragon blessed 
with just enough "waking madness" not to be disturbed by meaningless 
chitchat, while Vladimir chafes under his many crosses? Or is there a 
possibility that he is conscious of a determination rc^-to-think when he 
suggests conversing calmly, "since we are incapable of keeping silent . . . . 
It 's so we won't think. . . . [or] hear. . . . all the dead voices" (40)? 
Estragon appears to realize that there is no release in death, for the voices 
go on talking. The stage notes seem to confirm Estragon's understanding of 
the value of sleep and mental alienation as a defense to life's terrors. When 
Vladimir wakes him in Act One, Estragon is unhappily "restored to the horror of 
his situation" (11). Here once again fear which collapses into comedy is the 
groundwork upon which their uncoupling is built. 
Vladimir, though more intellectually solid than his companion, is greatly 
dependent on Estragon's simply being there, in the literal sense. He does not 
so much require an audience, as does Pozzo, or H a m m later on in Endgame, 
but simply needs the mere presence of Estragon to endorse his own existence, 
to give some rational meaning to his life. When Estragon shows up again in 
Act Two, Vladimir wants him to say he is happy to be back with him again 
"even if it's not t r u e " (39). Realizing that "one is not master of one's 
moods" (38), it is sufficient comfort merely to " m o u t h " words of encourage-
ment. Estragon enjoys their diversions to give him the impression they exist, 
but Vladimir is even more alien and alone when his partner is asleep or not 
emotionally in tune with him. Here we have the feeling that there are no 
vehicles of communication in Beckett's world. Even friendship is marked by 
features of absence: it is no more than the negation of that "irremediable 
solitude to which every human being is condemned" (P. 46). 
Just as the physical props in Mercier and Camier decayed and signalled the 
emotional dissolution of their relationship, it is perhaps some originary fault 
in language itself which provokes the couple's shared activity of non-
communication in Waiting for Godot. Vladimir 's song of the dog, for instance, 
is maniacally circular and never-ending; sentences trail off; stories, such as the 
one of the Englishman in the brothel, are never finished. This state of 
incompletion is brought about by habit, time, and memory. As I have stated 
before, time means very little to Estragon, who cannot even remember what 
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took place the day before. His thoughts fit neatly into the infinite number of 
repeated present moments, and he is content with improvisations. For this 
reason, he has more confidence in the tomorrow, unlike Vladimir who dreads 
the coming of the night. 
It is through reasoning, and ultimately through language, that their 
conflict finally rests. Their dialogue thus functions at once as an attractant and 
a repellant, a demand and a rejection, a possession and an eluding of each 
other. At the same time it reveals a friendship, for they speak of its endurance. 
" H o w long have we been together all the time now?" (35). Vladimir's 
memory also recalls a time when things nevertheless were better in the 
nineties. Then too, he remembers when he fished Estragon out of the Rhone 
when he threw himself in it. Now, however, their friendship approaches the 
boredom that Beckett speaks of in Proust. "Friendship implies an almost 
piteous acceptance of face values . . . It has no spiritual significance" (P. 47). 
Beckett points out that Proust "does not agree with the Nietzchean conception 
that friendship must be based on intellectual sympathy, because he does not 
see friendship as having the least intellectual significance . . . For him the 
exercise of friendship is tantamount to a sacrifice of that only real an 
incommunicable essence of oneself to the exigencies of a freightened habit 
whose confidence requires to-be restored by a dose of attention" (P. 47-8 
[emphasis my own]). 
Thus when Vladimir says, "There you are again . . . {Indifferent) There we 
are again . . . {Gloomy) There I am again" (38), Estragon recognizes his 
partner 's habitual boredom: "you see, you feel worse when I 'm with you" 
(38). They are uncomfortable with each other yet continue their relationship, 
one which repeatedly stresses their isolation. Both feel pain and want the other 
to see it, but neither can help the other. Estragon appears not to understand 
Vladimir 's intellectual anguish, and Vladimir seems not to comprehend 
Estragon's physical suffering. "Will you stop whining!" (46), Vladimir nags 
him. "He lp m e ! " Estragon cries out. But Vladimir only mocks him with a 
sarcastic " I t hur t s?" (7). Yet at other times, when Estragon calls out for help, 
he excludes his friend. " G o d pity m e ! " "And m e ? " Vladimir inquires 
depressingly (49). Suffering does not provide either of them with insight 
because, as two "separate dynamisms," they cannot share it. 
Because they are such experts at hurting each other, their friendship is 
reminiscent of that "desert of loneliness and recrimination" that Beckett 
speaks of in Proust (P. 38) with regard to love. Estragon is always the one who 
threatens to leave, or who suggests they might be better off parting, while 
Vladimir cuttingly retorts, " T h e n why do you always come crawling back?" 
(38), rather than admit his genuine need for him. 
And despite the suffering and isolation they feel in each other's presence, 
their mutual but largely unacknowledged need for each other sometimes 
manifests itself in compassion or tenderness. Vladimir craves someone to 
listen to him and to help him sort out his tangled web of confused thoughts. 
" C o m e on, Gogo, return the ball, can't you, once in a way?" (9). Estragon 
wants protection. So while Estragon at first repels him, Vladimir needs and 
depends on him. It is always Vladimir who makes the first move for emotional 
togetherness, for his tormented mind is less easily satisfied by physical reliefs. 
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He wakes Estragon because he is lonely, but in irritation will not listen in turn 
to his nightmares. But later on when Estragon sleeps, Vladimir sings a lullaby 
of sorts and covers up his friend with his coat and holds him closely when he 
wakes up terrified. 
Why, then, does Estragon cry out at the beginning of Act Two " D o n ' t 
touch me! Don' t question me! Don' t speak to me! Stay with m e ! " (37)? Here 
we have the sense of words not being able to cope with the psychic stress that 
pushes them out. For, it should be noted, more than any other piece of 
dialogue, this one expresses the conflicting nature of their partnership. This 
outburst signifies their acute separateness, and particularly Estragon's abjec-
tion. It also shows the flimsiness of their language, and ultimately, of their 
partnership. It is as though Estragon realizes that what holds them together is 
just a "pseudo-object"—Godot—and that they are, consequently, no more 
than a pseudocouple. 
Indeed, when Estragon asks "We 've lost our rights?" Vladimir prefers to 
avoid facing the problem squarely and puts it this way: " W e got rid of t h e m " 
(13). He imagines that their isolation is voluntary and that they are self-
directed. Beckett reveals his own irony through this comment, of course, for 
he had already stated in Proust that we are not free. Vladimir wants to believe 
that what they do is unique, but their very waiting belies them. And his 
insistence that they have waived their rights implies that he, anyway, is trying 
to see the two of them as independent things and not creatures of habit, 
despite what he admits later on. Habit, unfortunately, has them in its grip. 
Godot, as I have already stated, is habit, but they need him to give their lives 
meaning. Godot's very absence demonstrates the overwhelming presence they 
have accorded him. 
The word, Godot, brings us again to the recognition that it is language 
which is at the heart of their struggle. We are again reminded of Lacan's 
comparison of language to the game of fort da, of words "coupled" in presence 
through absence, where the world of meaning gives birth to a particular 
language in which the world of things will come to be arranged. Their 
language thus engenders the thing—Godot, who is the apotheosis of the 
pseudocouple in a single figure whose absence is the predicate of their 
(questionable) being. 
Because Godot is absent, Vladimir and Estragon suffer the emotion of 
loss, of what they desire Godot to bestow on them, and also the loss of their 
own structural integrity as a couple, Herbert Blau has said, "Even if the 
emotion of loss, amortized, were to vanish in time, the gradual labor of 
mourning would not . . . relieve the pain. It is the economics of grief, . . . 
which is the obsession-compulsion of all of Beckett's work, driven as it is by 
the desire for what is not-there and, chances are, never will be.6 And here again 
Beckett's thinking is binary. Godot is because he is not. By asserting this 
unity, Beckett denies it. It also echoes the binary nature of the pseudocouple's 
dialogues, such as the "we can ' t " which must of necessity follow the recurrent 
"let 's g o . " 
Both Beckett and Proust attempt to pin down the isolated self whose 
essence would be reached in a leap beyond the shackles of time. And both 
realize that the self becomes aware of a need for an other, whose presence 
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might offer some comfort to the multitude of his continually changing selves 
and thus remove the doubt that perhaps he is nothing or not totally alone. 
Proust felt he reached a solution through his idea of involuntary memory. 
Beckett is not so hopeful. He seems bent in this play on assessing the 
quality of life of the couple, which he finds arduous and often inadequate. At 
the same time, he seems to suggest through Vladimir and Estragon that 
coupling can indeed survive even where there are no common interests. They 
are of very little importance. Common values, on the other hand, are 
essential, such as their assumption of permanence. And their knowledge that 
what bothers each of them about the other is never going to change seems to 
be a mark of their maturity. Their mutual dependency is also a feature of their 
success in staying together. It is as though the illusions of a dream of perfection 
in partnership that drew them together in the first place are not damaged 
when they begin to find the annoying or irritating flaws in each other. 
But ironically, the more secure Beckett was to become after Waiting for 
Godot, the more his works become open-ended, abutting on unanswered and 
perhaps unanswerable questions. And even the developing formalism that he 
began with this work does not disguise its basically personal meaning: that of 
the instability of long-term coupling between ' ' two separate dynamisms," 
decanted and contaminated by time. 
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